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Close Privacy Overview This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. Its second and third stages are both solid-fueled. There are few details about the origin of the third stage.
The U. Defense Intelligence Agency was more explicit. A missile with such a range could threaten Europe. The Simorgh also is reported to use hypergolic propellant, a type of liquid fuel that is stored more easily, and thus is more militarily useful, than the cryogenic propellant often used in SLVs.
The Qased is of even greater concern. In addition, the Qased uses solid-fuel and was launched from a mobile platform with no advance warning. India appeared to follow such a path in its missile development, by gradually building on experience gained from Indian collaborations with NASA. Cruise missiles function essentially as pilotless aircraft. Cruise missiles can be divided into two categories based on their intended target set: land-attack and anti-ship.
Iran's development of LACMs may have received a boost in , when it purchased several Soviet Kh air-launched cruise missiles on the Ukrainian black market. It made slow progress over the subsequent decade in duplicating them, due at least in part to difficulty obtaining and producing complex turbojet or turbofan engines. Since , however, Iran has unveiled, tested, and used several new models. While the Soviet Kh AS was originally designed to carry a nuclear warhead, its Iranian Soumar variants have not been reported by the U.
According to non-governmental reporting, the Soumar and its variants are "possibly nuclear capable. The Soumar and its variants have additional substantial differences from the Kh, which is an air-launched missile with a range of 2, to 3, kilometers. The Soumar itself is a ground-launched missile with a maximum range of km. In February , Iran introduced an improved variant of the Soumar named Hoveizeh, with a reported range of 1, km. As of April , Iran does not have the highly enriched uranium needed to fuel a nuclear weapon.
Iran has worked on all of those things in the past. From the late s until , it coordinated efforts to develop a nuclear weapon under the Amad Plan. In , the IAEA reported that it had been shown documents containing evidence of high explosives testing, and work done to redesign the inner payload chamber of the Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle to accommodate a "nuclear device.
Included in this work was the development of explosive bridgewire detonators which, according to a IAEA report, had "characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device. Both U. After that date, nuclear weapon-related work was divided into covert and overt streams.
According to the IAEA, "some activities" related to the development of a nuclear explosive device took place between and Aerospace Force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh, a forceful proponent of missile development, is another key figure.
The IRGC Aerospace Force oversees the development and production of missiles and associated equipment, such as launchers and silos. As of May , its commander was Mahmud Baqeri Kazemabad.
According to its founding law, AIO is responsible for "research, design, building, production, purchase, sale, and support in the field of technologies related to missile systems and space industries in the defense sector. Apprehension about the objectives of Iran's ballistic missile program gave rise to international sanctions in the mids. In , the U. Security Council adopted resolution , which banned the supply of materials and technology to Iran that might aid nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The resolution also asked countries to freeze the assets of certain companies and individuals. Three subsequent Security Council resolutions, , , and increased sanctions and designated additional entities for their involvement with Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Combined, the resolutions asked countries to freeze the assets of several key Iranian missile entities. It "calls upon" Iran "not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons" and permits member states to sell missiles and missile systems to Iran on a case-by-case basis if approved by the Security Council.
No such sales have been approved as of June These restrictions expire in Resolution also maintains sanctions on many of the key entities supporting Iran's missile development. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in in part because the agreement did not adequately address missile proliferation and testing. The MTCR is a consortium of 35 countries whose goal is to restrict the proliferation of missiles and unmanned air systems that are capable of delivering a kg payload at least km.
MTCR members do so by adhering to a set of common export guidelines applied to a shared list of controlled items. Iran has regularly sought to acquire items on this shared list, and items just below the MTCR control threshold, using elaborate illicit procurement schemes involving overseas networks. North Korea furnished the basic hardware for liquid-fueled rocket propulsion; Russia supplied materials, equipment, and training; China supplied help with guidance and solid-fueled rocket propulsion.
In May , a U. The engines were most likely intended for use in the Shahab A March report by the U. For decades, Beijing has been a major supplier of ballistic missile technology. Beijing's help appears to have started in the s, during Iran's work on the Mushak missile. In , the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States known as the Rumsfeld Commission after its chair, Donald Rumsfeld reported that China had already "carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program.
In addition, Iran has received missile testing and guidance assistance from China. In June , the chairman of a Congressional hearing cited U.
A number of Chinese firms engaged in missile-related work have been sanctioned by the United States for proliferation activities with Iran. In June , the U. CPMIEC markets the "M-family" missile, liquid and solid rocket motors, precision machinery, and a variety of tactical missiles. Li reportedly worked through the Iranian embassy in Beijing to sell missile-usable components including gyroscopes, accelerometers, graphite cylinders, ultra-high strength steel, and high-grade aluminum alloy.
Li was added to the SDN list in and has been sanctioned and indicted numerous times by the United States. Other notable targets of U.
The Chinese government pledged to improve its proliferation posture, notably by committing not to assist any country in the development of a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, and by adopting a set of export control laws.
However, on five occasions between February and March the United States sanctioned Chinese entities for involvement in Iranian missile proliferation networks. Despite Russia's adherence to the MTCR since , Russian entities have helped Iran "develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production," according to a CIA report covering missile proliferation during the first half of Reportedly, Russian assistance included the supply of special alloys for long-range missiles, including steel for missile casings and foil to shield missile guidance components; stainless steel that could be used to make fuel tanks for Scuds; and navigation and guidance technology.
In addition, U. Russian entities allegedly involved in these activities were sanctioned by the United States in the late s. Russian assistance was critical in the early development of the Shahab missile.
Russia's arms exporting agency, Rosoboronexport, reportedly helped to construct a wind tunnel, which can be used to design and test missile components. In October , the Central Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that Russian assistance had "helped Iran save years in its development of the Shahab Moscow reportedly rejected an Iranian request to purchase the more advanced S air defense system in Iran has demonstrated an ability to design and produce advanced missiles, but as of it is not self-sufficient in doing so.
For instance, it appears to lack the ability to domestically produce certain materials, such as carbon fiber, in sufficient quantity or quality to mass-produce missiles, such as the Fateh, that incorporate those materials into their design.
Iran also needs such lightweight and heat resistant materials to help with re-entry for longer-range missiles. Tehran faces similar limitations in manufacturing complex components, such as small turbofan engines for powering high-end cruise missiles.
Tehran may also rely on technologies and expertise from abroad when designing new missiles. Iran has been able to reproduce and in some cases improve upon those designs, but it is unclear whether Tehran would be able to take big technological steps — such as developing an ICBM — without imports.
In particular, Iran may depend on foreign support to improve missile guidance, through technologies such as laser and fiber optic gyros.
Effective export controls can impede Iran from filling in these and other gaps in its missile capabilities. Iran in recent years has developed — and demonstrated in action — a number of advanced conventionally-armed missiles that can threaten U. It has also been increasingly willing to export these missiles, as well as missile production equipment, to its proxies in the region. Meanwhile, Iran's ballistic missiles remain a concern because of their ability to deliver nuclear weapons, should Iran choose to develop such weapons.
Iran may have maintained some part of a covert nuclear-military program that previously worked on arming a missile with a nuclear warhead. Key sources referenced are: for U. Iranian claims not corroborated by independent or U. But it is unlikely to be developed and fielded before A Zolfaghar missile. Iran fields a family of increasingly accurate, short- and now medium-range, solid-fuel missiles with ranges of up to 1, km miles , and possibly as far as 1, km miles according to Iranian sources.
Small winglets mounted just below the warhead section can thus steer the rocket to its target with greater precision. In principle, the Fateh , or its variants, Khalij-Fars and Hormuz, could be accurate enough to strike point-targets reliably. Since the early s, Iran has incorporated a series of structural and guidance modifications to improve the range and accuracy of the Fateh The Fateh Mobin includes an electro-optical seeker to further enhance missile accuracy.
The Fateh- type missiles carry payloads of about kg lbs. Zolfaghar , Dezful , and Haj Qasem Soleimani employ the same basic design principles of the Fateh -type systems but have slightly larger-diameter rocket motors that propel them to longer ranges, approximately , 1, and 1, km, respectively , and miles. The larger missiles are believed to carry warheads of about kg 1, lbs. Fatehs and Qiam-1s may have been used as well. These solid-fuel missiles are battlefield weapons possessing considerable warfighting capacity because of their accuracy.
Iran has a variety of drones capable of collecting and supplying target data for its precision-guided missiles. It remains unclear if Iran has the robust and secure communications network needed to enable real-time targeting. Iran flight tested, without success, the Khorramshar missile in January , although there is some reporting to suggest a test launch was conducted in as well.
Both tests reportedly failed. The Hwasong , referred to as the Musudan by U. All the tests failed, with one possible exception, so it is not surprising that the Iranian version is also suffering from some teething problems. Iranian officials say the Khorramshar has a maximum range of 2, km 1, miles when carrying an 1, kg 3, lbs warhead.
When fitted with a 1, kg 2, lbs payload, the missile should be able to reach targets at a range of almost 3, km 1, miles. A more definitive assessment of Khorramshar is only possible with additional details or flight test results. It demonstrated a new sophistication in multistage separation and propulsion systems. Iran has experienced some success with the Safir. Ten known launches have occurred since , with just four being deemed successful.
Two attempts to use Safir to orbit a satellite in failed, one while the rocket was being prepared. The Simorgh , which is the Persian name of a benevolent, mythical flying creature, is another carrier rocket to launch satellites. A mock-up was unveiled in Simorgh has failed all four attempts to orbit a satellite since The Simorgh is optimized for satellite launches and is largely unsuitable for use as a ballistic missile.
An ICBM based on Simorgh technology would be very large and cumbersome to deploy as a military system. If Iran opted to transform its Simorgh into an ICBM, it would take a handful of years, and would not likely become operational before or Without substantial modifications, the Simorgh could not reach the U. No country has ever converted a liquid-fueled satellite launcher into a long-range missile, primarily because the differing operational requirements make the transformation impractical.
The reconnaissance satellite was successfully lifted into orbit and has been producing low-resolution imagery of terrestrial targets of interest. Qased relies on a Ghadr missile for its first stage, and is topped by two small, solid-fuel stages. Its performance parameters are roughly equivalent to the Safir but has greater growth potential.
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